Jager, G. (2008) Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology , 253(1):131--141.

Jager, G. (2008) Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 253(1):131--141.

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