| 1989 | - | Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device - Hurford | :: | 102 |
| 1999 | - | The evolution of language - Nowak,Krakauer | :: | 93 |
| 1982 | - | Evolution and the Theory of Games - Maynard-Smith | :: | 44 |
| 1990 | - | Biological signals as handicaps - Grafen | :: | 29 |
| 1871 | - | The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex - Darwin | :: | 25 |
| 1975 | - | Logic and conversation - Grice | :: | 22 |
| 1975 | - | Mate selection--a selection for a handicap - Zahavi | :: | 21 |
| 1998 | - | Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics - Hofbauer,Sigmund | :: | 16 |
| 1949 | - | Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort - Zipf | :: | 13 |
| 1995 | - | Communication in discrete action-response games - Hurd | :: | 12 |
| 1966 | - | Universals of Language - Greenberg | :: | 12 |
| 2000 | - | Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game - Trapa,Nowak | :: | 11 |
| 1996 | - | Evolution of the Social Contract - Skyrms | :: | 10 |
| 1982 | - | Strategic information transmission - Crawford,Sobel | :: | 6 |
| 1973 | - | Job market signaling - Spence | :: | 5 |
| 1993 | - | Evolutionary stability in games of communication - Blume,Kim,Sobel | :: | 5 |
| 1993 | - | Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability - Warneryd | :: | 4 |
| 1969 | - | Convention - Lewis | :: | 4 |
| 1985 | - | On evolutionarily stable sets - Thomas | :: | 3 |
| 2003 | - | Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games - Cressman | :: | 2 |
| 2007 | - | Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system - Pawlowitsch | :: | 2 |
| 2007 | - | Evolution and the explanation of meaning - Huttegger | :: | 2 |
| 2007 | - | Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study - Jager | :: | 1 |
| 2004 | - | Signalling games select Horn strategies - van Rooij | :: | 1 |
| 1982 | - | Recurrence of the unfit - Akin,Hofbauer | :: | 1 |
| 1980 | - | A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts - Selten | :: | 1 |
| 1992 | - | Stability and evolutionary stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens - Swinkels | :: | 1 |