| Akin,Hofbauer, Recurrence of the unfit, 1982 | :: | 1 |
| Blume,Kim,Sobel, Evolutionary stability in games of communication, 1993 | :: | 5 |
| Crawford,Sobel, Strategic information transmission, 1982 | :: | 6 |
| Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, 2003 | :: | 2 |
| Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 1871 | :: | 25 |
| Grafen, Biological signals as handicaps, 1990 | :: | 29 |
| Greenberg, Universals of Language, 1966 | :: | 12 |
| Grice, Logic and conversation, 1975 | :: | 22 |
| Hofbauer,Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, 1998 | :: | 16 |
| Hurd, Communication in discrete action-response games, 1995 | :: | 12 |
| Hurford, Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device, 1989 | :: | 102 |
| Huttegger, Evolution and the explanation of meaning, 2007 | :: | 2 |
| Jager, Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study, 2007 | :: | 1 |
| Lewis, Convention, 1969 | :: | 4 |
| Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games, 1982 | :: | 44 |
| Nowak,Krakauer, The evolution of language, 1999 | :: | 93 |
| Pawlowitsch, Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system, 2007 | :: | 2 |
| Selten, A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts, 1980 | :: | 1 |
| Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, 1996 | :: | 10 |
| Spence, Job market signaling, 1973 | :: | 5 |
| Swinkels, Stability and evolutionary stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens, 1992 | :: | 1 |
| Thomas, On evolutionarily stable sets, 1985 | :: | 3 |
| Trapa,Nowak, Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game, 2000 | :: | 11 |
| van Rooij, Signalling games select Horn strategies, 2004 | :: | 1 |
| Warneryd, Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability, 1993 | :: | 4 |
| Zahavi, Mate selection--a selection for a handicap, 1975 | :: | 21 |
| Zipf, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort, 1949 | :: | 13 |