| 1999 | - | The evolution of language - Nowak,Krakauer | :: | 93 |
| 2002 | - | Computational and evolutionary aspects of language - Nowak,Komarova,Niyogi | :: | 49 |
| 1990 | - | Biological signals as handicaps - Grafen | :: | 29 |
| 1998 | - | Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics - Hofbauer,Sigmund | :: | 16 |
| 2000 | - | Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game - Trapa,Nowak | :: | 11 |
| 2000 | - | Evolutionary biology of language - Nowak | :: | 11 |
| 2004 | - | Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world - Komarova,Niyogi | :: | 10 |
| 1996 | - | Evolution of the Social Contract - Skyrms | :: | 10 |
| 1973 | - | Job market signaling - Spence | :: | 5 |
| 1983 | - | Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems, and Bifurcations of Vector Fields - Guckenheimer,Holmes | :: | 5 |
| 2003 | - | Animal Signals - Maynard-Smith,Harper | :: | 5 |
| 1969 | - | Convention - Lewis | :: | 4 |
| 2003 | - | Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games - Cressman | :: | 2 |
| 2000 | - | The Mathematical Theory of Selection, Recombination, and Mutation - Burger | :: | 2 |
| 2007 | - | Evolution and the explanation of meaning - Huttegger | :: | 2 |
| 1981 | - | Applications of Centre Manifold Theory - Carr | :: | 1 |
| 1963 | - | Morse Theory - Milnor | :: | 1 |
| 2008 | - | Why evolution does not always lead to a signaling system - Pawlowitsch | :: | 1 |
| 1998 | - | Signalling among relatives III - Bergstrom,Lachmann | :: | 1 |
| 1999 | - | Evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection - Binmore,Samuelson | :: | 1 |
| 1985 | - | The selection mutation equation - Hofbauer | :: | 1 |
| 1994 | - | Mutation load and mutation-selection-balance in quantitative genetic traits - Burger,Hofbauer | :: | 1 |
| 2001 | - | The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms - Crespi | :: | 1 |
| 2008 | - | Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games - Huttegger,Skyrms,Smead,Zollman | :: | 1 |
| 1999 | - | Microbial Signaling and Communication - England,Hobbs,Bainton,Roberts | :: | 1 |
| 2007 | - | Finite populations choose an optimal language. - Pawlowitsch | :: | 1 |
| 1995 | - | Learning to be imperfect: the ultimatum game - Gale,Binmore,Samuelson | :: | 1 |