| xxxx | - | Cheating as a mixed strategy in a simple model of aggressive communication - Szamado | :: | 2 |
| 2001 | - | Evolution of universal grammar - Nowak,Komarova,Niyogi | :: | 90 |
| 2000 | - | Cheap talk when interests conflict - Silk,Kaldor,Boyd | :: | 5 |
| 2000 | - | The evolution of syntactic communication - Nowak,Plotkin,Jansen | :: | 81 |
| 2000 | - | Economics and Language - Rubinstein | :: | 3 |
| 2000 | - | The death of costly signalling - Lachmann,Bergstrom,Szamado | :: | 1 |
| 2000 | - | Survival of the Clearest - Pinker | :: | 4 |
| 2000 | - | Error, Population Structure and the Origin of Diverse Sign Systems - Grassly,von Haeseler,Krakauer | :: | 9 |
| 1999 | - | The evolutionary language game - Nowak,Plotkin,Krakauer | :: | 51 |
| 1999 | - | The evolution of language - Nowak,Krakauer | :: | 93 |
| 1998 | - | Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not add up - Getty | :: | 2 |
| 1998 | - | Ritual/speech coevolution: a solution to the problem of deception - Knight | :: | 5 |
| 1998 | - | Signalling among relatives - Lachmann,Bergstrom | :: | 2 |
| 1998 | - | Signalling among relatives - Bergstrom,Lachmann | :: | 1 |
| 1997 | - | The cost of dishonesty - Viljugrein | :: | 2 |
| 1997 | - | Towards a general theory of biological signaling - Hasson | :: | 1 |
| 1997 | - | The Major Transitions in Evolution - Maynard-Smith,Szathmary | :: | 57 |
| 1997 | - | Animal Behaviour - Zahavi | :: | 1 |
| 1996 | - | The dilemma of Saussurean communication - Oliphant | :: | 60 |
| 1995 | - | Evolutionary theory of parent-o#spring conflict - Godfray | :: | 1 |
| 1995 | - | Communication in discrete action-response games - Hurd | :: | 12 |
| 1995 | - | Animal signals: Models and terminology - Maynard-Smith,Harper | :: | 10 |
| 1995 | - | What are conventional signals - Guilford,Dawkins | :: | 2 |
| 1994 | - | Must reliable signals always be costly - Maynard-Smith | :: | 4 |
| 1994 | - | Cheating signals - Hasson | :: | 4 |
| 1994 | - | The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language - Pinker | :: | 120 |
| 1994 | - | Trait elaboration via adaptive mate choice: sexual conflict in the evolution of signals of male quality - Hill | :: | 1 |
| 1992 | - | The continuous Sir Philip Sidney game: A simple model of biological signalling - Johnstone,Grafen | :: | 2 |
| 1991 | - | Signalling of need by o#spring to their parents - Godfray | :: | 1 |
| 1991 | - | On the defination of sexual selection, fisher's model, and the evolution of waste and of signals in general - Zahavi | :: | 1 |
| 1991 | - | Honest signalling: The Philip Sidney game - Maynard-Smith | :: | 4 |
| 1990 | - | Language and Species - Bickerton | :: | 87 |
| 1990 | - | Biological signals as handicaps - Grafen | :: | 29 |
| 1990 | - | Natural language and natural selection - Pinker,Bloom | :: | 168 |
| 1989 | - | Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device - Hurford | :: | 102 |
| 1988 | - | The evolution of aggression: can selection generate variability - Maynard-Smith,Harper | :: | 2 |
| 1987 | - | Social control of deception among status signalling house sparrows Passer domesticus - Moller | :: | 2 |
| 1985 | - | Communication during aggressive interactions with particular reference to variation in choice of behaviour - Enquist | :: | 6 |
| 1984 | - | Phenotypic plasticity and the handicap principle - Nur,Hasson | :: | 1 |
| 1982 | - | The evolution of reliable and unreliable badges of fighting ability - Rohwer | :: | 2 |
| 1980 | - | Rules and representations - Chomsky | :: | 55 |
| 1978 | - | Status signals in Harris' sparrows: experimental deceptions achieved - Rohwer,Rohwer | :: | 1 |
| 1977 | - | The cost of honesty - Zahavi | :: | 2 |
| 1975 | - | Status signaling in harris sparrows: Some experiments in deception - Rohwer | :: | 1 |
| 1975 | - | The social significance of avian winter plumage variability - Rohwer | :: | 2 |
| 1975 | - | Mate selection a selection for a handicap - Zahavi | :: | 21 |
| 1889 | - | The Theory of the Leisure Class - Veblen | :: | 3 |