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Abstract

ChickenHawk is a social-dilemma game in which the only way to win is to play ''Hawk'' against ''Chicken.'' The purpose of the game is to distinguish between uncoordinated and coordinated self-sacrifice. In a test of four signaling conditions with players who belong to a culturally homogeneous population, a 'cheap talk' condition led to efficient coordination, whereas signaling opportunities engaging social reputation and allowing eye-contact without speech yielded poorly coordinated altruistic behavior. The implications are: (1) without language, mere willingness to cooperate on a social dilemma is insufficient for coordinating intentions, and (2) given a sufficiently cohesive social group, language can coordinate inequitable, altruistic sacrifices of modest but real material incentives, even where fully anonymous defection is an option.

@inproceedings{jeffreys06evolang,
  author={Mark Jeffreys},
  title={Natural-language 'cheap talk' enables coordination on a social-dilemma game in a culturally homogeneous population},
  year={2006},
  pages={145-151},
  booktitle={Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Evolution of Language},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/jeffreys06evolang.html}
}

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