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Authoritative: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1029   (Publisher's PDF... likely be available here.)

CiteSeer: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/context/1059504/0

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Abstract

I define neologism-proofness, a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cheap-talk games. It applies when players have a preexisting common language, so that an unexpected message's literal meaning is clear, and only credibility restricts communication. I show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism-proof; in some games, no equilibrium is.

@article{farrell93meaningAnd,
  author={Joseph Farrell},
  title={Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={1993},
  volume={5},
  number={4},
  pages={514-31},
  doi={10.1006/game.1993.1029},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/farrell93meaningAnd.html}
}