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Abstract
The systematic and universal communicative behaviour that drives human beings to give honest information to conspecifics during long-lasting conversational episodes still represents a Darwinian paradox. Attempts to solve it by comparing conversation with a mere reciprocal cooperative information exchange is at odds with the reality of spontaneous language use. The Costly Signalling Theory has recently attracted attention as a tentative explanation of the evolutionary stability of language. Unfortunately, it makes the wrong prediction that only elite individuals would talk. I show that as far as social bonding is assortative in our species, generalised signalling through language becomes a viable strategy to attract allies.BibTex
@inproceedings{dessalles06generalisedSignalling,
author={Jean-Louis Dessalles},
title={Generalised signalling: a possible solution to the paradox of language},
year={2006},
pages={75-82},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Evolution of Language},
url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/dessalles06generalisedSignalling.html}
}
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