| 2008 | - | Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals - Jager |
:: | |
| | Blume, A., Kim, Y.-G., Sobel, J., 1993. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games Econ. Behav. 5, 547-575.
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| 1999 | - | The learning barrier: Moving from innate to learned systems of communication - Oliphant |
:: | 42 |
| | Blume, A., Y. Kim, and J. Sobel (1993). Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547--575.
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| 1997 | - | Learning and the emergence of coordinated communication - Oliphant,Batali |
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| | [11] Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim, and Joel Sobel. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:547--575, 1993.
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| 1997 | - | Formal Approaches to Innate and Learned Communication: Laying the Foundation for Language - Oliphant |
:: | 25 |
| | Blume, A., Y. Kim, and J. Sobel (1993). Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547--575.
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| 1995 | - | Small Signaling Systems can Evolve in the Absence of Benefit to the Information Sender - Batali |
:: | 9 |
| | Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim, and Joel Sobel. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:547--575, 1993.
|